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Introduction 
 
Last Exit Basel III 
As Regulation of Bank Capital Comes to a Close, Stability Concerns Risk Taking 
a Backseat 
Laura von Daniels 
Following the global financial crisis, in 2009 the world’s major economies (G20) quickly 
agreed on stricter rules for financial markets. Heads of government tasked the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with developing a new framework for the 
capitalisation and liquidity of globally active financial institutions and the agreement 
(Basel III) was signed in December 2010. A crucial area that was left to be finalized later 
were final rules on the use of banks’ internal risk models. While it has been the US 
government’s intention to restrict risk models the EU made it clear that it would not 
agree to additional rules leading to increased regulatory capital requirements. After a 
long stalemate in the negotiations, chances now seem to increase for an agreement in 
fall 2017 between European and US representatives in the Basel Committee. The Trump 
administration might be willing to meet the EU halfway and grant Europe’s ailing 
banks greater freedom in calculating risk. But the price could be high: the US wants 
more leeway in national interpretations of the Basel framework. The European Com-
mission, which will have to give its agreement in Basel, needs to be aware of the risks 
this poses to the stability of its own banking market. 
 
Ten years after the financial crisis hit the 
US, attempts to regulate global banks are 
increasingly characterised by nations going 
it alone instead of seeking cooperative solu-
tions that would benefit all countries in the 
long term. At first glance, the regulation of 
banks and capitalisation of globally active 
institutions have indeed been noticeably 
improved (see Chart 1, p. 2). But closer in-
spection reveals that consumer protection 
and measures that contribute to the stabil-
ity of the global financial system are being 
sidelined in favour of the vested interests of 
banks and financial companies. These pro-
cesses unfolding in the BCBS and other fora 
of financial-market regulation began well 
before Donald Trump was elected US presi-
dent. But concern is now growing that, 
under Trump, the US could withdraw en-
tirely from the international regulatory 
framework on financial markets. Following 
the Trump administration’s first few 
months in office, the impression is hard to 
avoid that the odds of an internationally 
agreed regulation of financial markets have 
been reduced. Shortly after Trump assumed
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Chart 1 
Risk-Weighted Common Equity Tier (CET 1/RWA) 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Global Capital Index, June 2016. 
office, senior Republican politicians criti-
cised the rules issued by the Basel Commit-
tee for excessively curtailing Washington’s 
sovereignty. Via executive order, the presi-
dent has already revoked certain areas of 
consumer protection regarding financial-
services provisions. Republican draft legis-
lation, the Financial Choice Act, could 
also retract important areas of regulation 
covered by the Dodd-Frank Act (see Table, 
p. 6). It is furthermore conceivable that the 
UK might withdraw from international 
cooperation on financial-market regulation 
in the coming years. Over the past decade, 
the UK has made an important contribu-
tion to the stability and transparency of 
the financial system alongside the US. 
Following the Brexit decision, however, 
its continued involvement is not at all 
guaranteed. 
Stringent Regulation under Obama 
Immediately after the crisis, the US pursued 
a regulatory approach that was imple-
mented in less time and went considerably 
further in crucial areas than the EU’s. First, 
Washington was much quicker to regulate 
the financial markets. As early as July 2010, 
Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
which intervened substantially in the free-
doms of the large banks. In July 2013 the US 
Federal Reserve Board published a comple-
mentary package of measures, the US Basel 
III Final Rule. Second, the US government 
used specific regulations – such as the 
Collins Amendment, the Volcker Rule and 
new rules on risk classification in securiti-
sation – to check the financial sector pre-
cisely in those areas where it had taken the 
greatest risks before the crisis: in the invest-
ment business. Third, the US did not only
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Chart 2 
Basel III Leverage Ratio 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Global Capital Index, June 2016. 
focus its regulatory measures on banks, but 
decided to extend new standards to non-
bank financial companies (e.g. private equity 
funds, wealth funds). Moreover, as of 2014 
the government also compelled foreign-
bank subsidiaries active in the US to imple-
ment the new US standards (in a departure 
from the principle of Home Country Rule).  
A possible explanation for the US govern-
ment’s regulatory approach can be found 
in the structure of the domestic financial 
market. But, more importantly, the admin-
istration took a deliberate decision to pri-
oritise the stability of the financial system 
over the short-term business interests of 
the financial industry. In order to guaran-
tee that financial institutions on US soil 
remained competitive, the Obama admin-
istration then tried to extend its own finan-
cial-market rules internationally. As part 
of this, Washington pushed for the Basel 
standards for banking regulation to be 
tightened. The UK, whose financial system 
and institutions resemble the US’s, also 
reacted quickly to the financial crisis, 
taking similar regulatory steps from 2009 
onwards: separating commercial and in-
vestment banking activities (ring-fencing), 
and establishing an adjustable leverage 
ratio and restrictions on derivatives. 
In both cases, the US and the UK, tighter 
regulation did little damage to the finan-
cial companies active there. It actually 
allowed profits to increase. As the data 
shows, returns of US-UK banks are now 
markedly higher than those of banks in 
continental Europe (see Chart 3, p. 4).
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Chart 3 
Return on Equity (RoE) % (TTM) 
Source: Morningstar, 5 May 2017. 
Europe as Regulatory Laggard  
The EU took longer to develop regulatory 
responses to the crisis without proceeding 
any more rigorously than the US or UK. 
This can be seen, for example, in the way 
non-performing loans (NPL) are treated. Not 
only do NPLs remain in bank balance sheets 
in several EU member states, posing signifi-
cant risks to the respective national finance 
systems but they also have a destabilising 
effect on the euro zone as a whole. While 
the European Central Bank has recently 
established guidelines for banks on how to 
resolve NPLs further action is necessary. 
What is needed are binding rules for mem-
ber states on tackling banks that ignore the 
guidelines. Beyond these, national regula-
tors and banks need further support, en-
abling the latter to finally sell toxic assets 
on a new market and to take necessary 
balance sheet adjustments. 
Another area where the EU has been 
slow to fulfil its regulatory promises is the 
implementation of Basel III capital and 
liquidity rules. The European Commission 
has in fact attempted to embed the new 
international standards set out by the Basel 
agreement EU-wide, by promulgating a 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and 
the reworked Capital Requirements Direc-
tive (CRD IV). However, to this day national 
exceptions allow banks to circumvent parts 
of the Basel standards. These include the 
quality of a bank’s equity, the use of bank 
internal risk models to reduce costs of regu-
latory capital, and the approach to sover-
eign risk. Not only has the Basel Committee 
pointed this out in three published progress 
reports. But independent voices outside of 
the BCBS have also frequently condemned 
the reluctance of EU states to apply firmly 
agreed international rules consistently. 
Looking for explanations, an obvious 
factor seems to be the lack of institutional 
capacity to reign in financial risks, at least 
at the beginning of the Global Financial 
 
-40,5
-26,7
-11,2
-2,1
0,3
2,4
6,2 6,3 6,8 6,8 7,3 7,5
9,1 10,6 10,6
11,3 11,8 11,9
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
M
on
te
 d
ei
 P
as
ch
i
U
n
ic
re
d
it
R
oy
al
 B
an
k 
of
 S
co
tl
an
d
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
B
an
k
H
SB
C
B
ar
cl
ay
s
So
ci
ét
é 
G
én
ér
al
e
C
ré
d
it
 A
gr
ic
ol
e
C
it
ig
ro
u
p
Sa
n
ta
n
d
er
B
an
k 
of
 A
m
er
ic
a
B
N
P 
Pa
ri
ba
s
M
or
ga
n
 S
ta
n
le
y
JP
 M
or
ga
n
 C
h
as
e
G
ol
d
m
an
 S
ac
h
s
IN
G
 B
an
k
W
el
ls
 F
ar
go
N
or
d
ea
SWP Comments 22 
July 2017 
5 
Crisis. The EU did not commence its step-by-
step introduction of a banking union until 
2014. Moreover, at the EU level the decision-
making process in banking policy (much as 
in trade policy) does not yet operate smooth-
ly. But leaving aside these constraints, the 
EU’s negotiation strategy in the BCBS, to-
gether with its slow implementation record, 
begs the question of whether the European 
Commission has in fact consistently priori-
tised its stability objective over the business 
interests of the euro-zone banks.  
Regulator’s Dilemma 
Amplified by the EU’s lasting economic 
weakness, European policy makers have 
been facing a difficult trade-off in regulat-
ing financial institutions. On the one hand, 
they can privilege the profits of banks head-
quartered in the EU in the hope of kick-
starting economic growth. On the other 
hand, they need to place tighter restrictions 
on the banks’ riskiest business activities to 
improve the stability of the financial sys-
tem. There are no simple solutions, and the 
focus now tends to be on who will bear 
the costs of the decisions made by the Euro-
pean Commission and EU member states in 
the Basel Committee. The most recent dis-
pute in the BCBS over rules on banks’ inter-
nal risk calculation illustrates this. On the 
one hand, the EU member states are deter-
mined to protect the competitive interests 
of the banks headquartered there compared 
to rivals in the US (and in future potentially 
in the UK as well). The European Commis-
sion and Germany’s Central Bank and Fed-
eral Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) 
are therefore battling for flexible regula-
tions and defending special conditions for 
European banks. On the other hand, citi-
zens demand stable markets and reduced 
risks. In a world of globally active banks 
and financial companies, stability depends 
on stringent international rules. Since 
governments can still not credibly distance 
themselves from bank bailouts, the concern 
is that taxpayers will once more carry the 
main burden of future crises. If that hap-
pened, the dissolution of the euro zone 
would be almost impossible to avoid, and 
even the future of the EU would be threat-
ened. Europe clearly needs a debate on the 
financial-markets policy pursued by the 
European Commission – and by important 
EU countries such as Germany and France – 
in international fora including the Basel 
Committee, and on the far-reaching con-
sequences of that policy. 
European Commission to the Rescue? 
Against the tense political backdrop within 
the G20, the EU needs to ask itself what 
role it intends to play in future banking 
and financial market regulation. Could the 
current uncertainty make the European 
Commission, of all parties, the preserver of 
financial-market stability when it has re-
cently been more of an obstruction to estab-
lishing stricter rules for banks? That seems 
doubtful – but in case the Commission does 
indeed shoulder the responsibility for stabi-
lising financial markets, it should concen-
trate on three objectives.  
First, it should settle its dispute with the 
US over regulatory restrictions of internal 
bank risk models, and use the German 
presidency of the G20 in 2017 to wrap up 
this still-unfinished chapter of Basel III. 
Under the current proposal of a mandatory 
output floor on bank internal risk calcula-
tion, banks within the EU would still be 
allowed to give their lending a risk weight-
ing of up to 25 percent lower than standard 
models. In return, however, the US banks 
are asking for more flexible standard mod-
els, allowing for national interpretations 
of Basel rules. While this may seem like an 
agreeable solution from the European 
banks’ perspective, the European Commis-
sion now has to gauge very carefully what 
the future risks may be for its own financial 
system, in particular if the largest banks are 
given more leeway again. 
Second, the Commission should make 
the leverage ratio binding as of 2019, as 
provided by Basel III. Banks in the EU could 
then be penalised for letting equity drop
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Table 
Will there be a U-Turn in Financial Regulation under Trump? 
 
Suspension of the Fiduciary Rule 
 
 
 
 
Hanging the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) out to dry 
 
 
 
 
Raising the threshold for designation 
as a systemically important bank 
 
 
 
Relaxed equity requirements for 
banks’ derivatives trade 
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The Fiduciary Rule, issued by Obama, obliges financial advisors to recom-
mend only retirement investments that are in the best interests of their 
customers. On taking office, Trump used an executive order to suspend the 
rule until June 2016. It now risks being abolished. 
 
The Republicans want to put this important and hitherto independent 
new consumer-protection agency under congressional oversight. With this 
financial leverage, they could remove significant CFPB powers. Since 
March, an ongoing court case has also tried to settle whether Trump can 
dismiss the agency’s director, appointed by Obama, without justification. 
 
There is bipartisan consensus on reducing the number of banks that are 
designated systemically important because of the size of their balance 
sheet and their interconnectedness. That would exclude more institutions 
from the strictest monitoring and regulation. 
 
The Obama administration did not lay down stricter standards for the 
high-risk derivatives trade until late 2016. Trump could now relax these 
provisions without the approval of Congress, on the basis of the Con-
gressional Review Act (CRA). The CRA authorises him to unilaterally 
rescind all decrees issued during the last six months of the predecessor 
government. 
 
Abolishing bank stress tests for the 
largest banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abolishing the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority (OLA) 
 
 
Abolishing obligatory living wills for 
SIFIs 
 
Reducing the leverage ratio 
requirements for SIFIs 
 
 
 
Better liquidity assessments for 
Fannie-Mae and Freddie-Mac 
mortgages 
 
p
o
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This would release large systemically important banks and other financial 
institutions (SIFIs) from compulsory critical review by the US regulators as 
long as they make a one-off declaration of their willingness to meet higher 
equity requirements. The abolition may be confirmed by Congress as part 
of a Republican draft law, the Financial Choice Act (FCA), drawn up by 
Republican Jeb Hensarling. In early June 2016, the proposal already ob-
tained a majority in the House of Representatives in a vote along party 
lines. However, in the Senate it will be much harder to obtain vital Demo-
crats’ votes. 
 
Using the FCA, control over the liquidation of ailing banks and SIFIs could 
be removed from the FDIC’s jurisdiction. Its budgets required for orderly 
liquidation proceedings would then be cut. 
 
Under the FCA, SIFIs would no longer have to present extensive plans for 
potential liquidation proceedings. 
 
The FCA stipulates a higher leverage ratio for large banks that take higher 
risks. However, Finance Minister Steven Mnuchin’s position is still unclear. 
Financial analysts expect profit increases of up to 10 percent per bank 
share for the eight biggest US banks if the requirements are lowered. 
 
This would reduce the costs to the state-funded mortgage banks of pro-
viding high-quality regulatory liquid assets (HQLA). 
 
Abolishing the Volcker Rule 
u
n
li
k
el
y 
To abolish the Volcker Rule completely, both Houses of Congress would 
have to pass the FCA. It is currently unlikely to obtain a majority in the 
Senate. However, it is also possible to water down the Rule without 
changing the law, namely via the authorities (personnel is politics). 
 
 Source: author’s own presentation. 
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below 3 percent of their overall balance. 
Under Basel III, the Commission should also 
introduce a higher leverage ratio of 6 per-
cent for systemically important banks as of 
2019. To improve the equity base lastingly, 
the Commission will also have to push 
ahead with resolving non-performing loans 
in the EU, which make up over 1,000 
billion euros or 7 percent of the EU’s GDP. 
NPLs are an indicator of future losses and 
associated equity losses. If the Commission 
managed to solve this problem it would not 
only increase the stability of its own finan-
cial market, but also its standing as a rele-
vant actor in the international financial 
system. Moreover, it could also simplify the 
Brexit negotiations with the UK, since both 
sides could then draw on an international 
standard. In the best scenario, the EU would 
learn from the UK’s experience with a flex-
ible ratio and work with the UK on an equi-
ty ratio that reacts even better to emerging 
systemic risks in the financial system 
(macroprudential risk). 
Third, the Commission needs to keep 
pushing banks to meet the new liquidity 
standards (liquidity coverage ratio, net 
stable funding ratio). Important steps have 
already been taken in that direction, and 
Europe’s banks have now largely reached 
the provisional targets. However, the 
requirements stipulated as of 2019 are far 
from being met by all banks  The capital 
shortfall of these institutions should not be 
underestimated. After all, the G20 primari-
ly blamed the lack of liquid capital held by 
financial institutions for the rapid spread 
of the crisis following the insolvency of the 
US investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
2008. Finally, the EU should continue to 
reach out to the US and UK in all the appro-
priate fora (Basel Committee, Financial 
Stability Board, US-EU Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue). Only if the EU main-
tains its dialogue with other financial cen-
tres can it draw Washington’s and London’s 
attention to any negative effects of the new 
financial-markets policy and continue to 
work towards cooperative political solutions. 
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